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SUMMARYPurely national migration policies are increasingly ineffective
in addressing the EU’s urgent migration challenges. But progress to date
on a common EU policy has been patchy, and the failed Irish referendum
further delays the introduction of qualified majority voting in this area. So
what should be the EU’s priorities? We identify high-skilled migration,
irregular migration and asylum policy as the key areas for common
action, while mid- and low-skilled legal migration and the integration
challenge should continue to be dealt with at the national level.While the
EU immigration agenda may receive a welcome airing during the French
EU presidency, it needs a balanced mix of restrictive and accommodating
measures to succeed.
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High-skilled immigration: the European Commission’s draft Blue Card
directive needs to be revised so that it genuinely offers access to the
entire EU labour market. Developing countries concerned about brain
drain should be offered an opt-out clause. Irregular migration: Tighter
controls should be combined with better and common humanitarian stan-
dards and an agreement on
continuous ‘earned regular-
isation’ as an alternative to
haphazard mass regulari-
sations. Asylum: A ‘new
Nansen’ scheme offering
25,000 humanitarian
immigration slots per year
is proposed, the funding
and allocation of which are
to be organised at
European level.
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STRAIT IS THE GATE – EUROPE’S IMMIGRATION PRIORITIES
EUROPE’S MIGRATION CHALLENGE
needs to be addressed with
urgency. First, migratory pressure
is on the rise as more people from
poorer countries consider migra-
tion a realistic option for a better
life. Second, EU member states
with a significant stock of immi-
grants are confronted with a major
integration challenge as the
aspirations of many second-gen-
eration migrants are frustrated by
poor education and poor labour
market performance – if integra-
tion policies fail, large ethnic
underclasses will become a per-
manent feature in the EU. Third,
global competition for high-skilled
workers has intensified owing to
skill-biased technological change
and globalisation and the EU
struggles to attract and retain top
talent. With the internal mobility
agenda in the aftermath of EU
enlargement settled, the time to
address the external migration
challenge is now. 
Traditionally, immigration policy is
considered a national
responsibility. Decisions on who is
allowed to enter a country and who
is not can even been viewed as a
tenet of national sovereignty.
However, within the EU and the
Schengen area in particular, purely
national policies are becoming
increasingly ineffective. For this
reason, the EU has already started
to develop a common European
immigration policy under the
Hague programme which extends
until 2010. 
But progress to date has been
uneven and the failed Irish referen-
dum further delays the introduc-
tion of qualified majority voting on
European immigration policy.
Against this backdrop, it is positive
that immigration features promi-
nently on the French EU
presidency’s agenda. This may
give new momentum to the
current legislative proposals and
shape the EU’s work programme
on immigration beyond 2010.
However, when decision-making is
fraught with difficulties, careful
prioritisation is
required. Where is
the need for a
common European
approach most
pressing? And what
should continue to
be dealt with at the
national level? As in
other fields, European policies are
needed in areas where cross-bor-
der spill-overs are material and
national preferences well aligned,
national responsibility continuing
to prevail elsewhere. 
The following sections attempt to
apply the above logic to the areas
of legal migration, irregular migra-
tion, asylum, and integration
policy. For those areas identified
as EU priorities, concrete policy
proposals are developed, compar-
ing and contrasting them to the
known details of the agenda of the
French EU presidency where
appropriate. The final section con-
cludes and summarises the policy
recommendations. 
1. LEGAL IMMIGRATION
Currently, the spill-over effects
caused by legal immigration
remain relatively small even with-
in the Schengen area. The status of
third-country nationals as legal
immigrants only becomes
‘portable’ between member states
after five years of legal residence
within the EU. After the first five
years, immigrants have usually
already made a substantial invest-
ment in a local social network and
have aged somewhat, both factors
reducing their propensity to move
on. While in principle there would
always be the possibility for legal
migrants to move and work within
the entire Schengen area on an
irregular basis even
before five years
had elapsed, any
move that led to a
loss of legal status
would typically be
unattractive. 
Therefore, blanket
harmonisation of legal
immigration policies should not be
regarded as an urgent priority at
the EU level. In addition, prefer-
ences among member states
regarding low- and mid-skilled
legal migration often differ sub-
stantially. However, there is one
major exception - high-skilled
immigration - where preferences
among member states are
generally much better aligned and
where a common European solu-
tion could make Europe much
more attractive in the global com-
petition for talent.
Figure 1 shows that the percent-
age of the university-educated
among foreign-born inhabitants is
currently well below the OECD
average for the typical EU country.
There is little doubt that the world’s
English-speaking countries have a
substantial advantage when it
comes to attracting high-skilled
immigrants because English is the
lingua francaof the globalised age.
Hence, non English-speaking
countries will need to offer high-
skilled immigrants at least as
‘Blanket harmonisation
of legal immigration
policies should not be
regarded as an urgent
priority at the EU level.’STRAIT IS THE GATE – EUROPE’S IMMIGRATION PRIORITIES
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attractive conditions of entry as
English-speaking countries in
order to compensate for the lan-
guage disadvantage. 
The recent flurry of national
attempts to improve the legal
basis for attracting high-skilled
migrants, including the recent
‘carte des compétences et talents’
in France, illustrates the progress
that has been made in this
respect. However, there is one
important feature that purely
national initiatives will not be able
to offer: immediate access to the
entire EU labour market. For highly
specialised immigrants this would
undoubtedly be attractive. For
example, an Indian high-skilled
migrant with a job offer in Vienna
will accept it much more readily if
this guarantees access to the
entire EU labour market.  Were the
first job to prove unattractive or
the family to have difficulties
adjusting, the option value of
being able to transfer to, say,
Manchester (and not just within
Austria to, say, Innsbruck) would
be substantial. 
Blue Card
To achieve this enhanced
portability of status, a European
Blue Card for high-skilled immi-
grants has been proposed
1.
However,  while the European
Commission’s draft directive on
the creation of a Blue Card is a key
step in the right direction, it is
unfortunately weak on status
portability. Transferring from one
member state to another using the
Blue Card in its currently proposed
form would be almost as difficult
as applying for a fresh Blue Card
upon first entry from outside the
Union. 
The larger the labour market to
which an immigration permit
offers access, and the more per-
manent this access is, the more
attractive the destination is for
high-skill migrants. This is illus-
trated in Figure 2, where the most
attractive immigration status –
citizenship – is in the top right
corner. The current EU Blue Card
proposal would not be competitive
compared to the US H1B visa for
the highly skilled or the US Green
Card. The US arrangements set a
much more generous initial period
of validity than the Blue Card and,
in contrast to the poor portability
of the Blue Card within the EU,
grant access to the entire US
labour market. The current Blue
Card proposal thus needs to be
improved substantially in both
dimensions to position the EU
more favourably in the global com-
petition for talent, as indicated by
the arrow in Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Tertiary-educated among foreign-born
(Deviations from the OECD average of 23 percent)
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Figure 2: The Blue Card needs improved durability and portability of
status to be competitive
Source: OECD, own calculations.
1See von Weizsäcker
(2006) for the original
proposal of the ‘Blue
Card’.b
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A lack of effective portability of the
Blue Card even risks undermining
the whole point of this EU exercise
since portability would be the prin-
cipal added value of an EU scheme
compared to any national scheme.
But there is little hope that an
agreement among member states
can be reached to strengthen
portability on the basis of the
currently proposed access
criterion for the Blue Card of three
times the minimum wage in the
first member state in which the
migrant works. Since the level of
the minimum wage compared to
the median wage varies substan-
tially between member states, the
economic rationale for the
proposed eligibility criterion is
weak at the outset. More impor-
tantly, a Blue Card that can be
obtained on the basis of, say,
monthly earnings of as low as
€400 in Romania is unlikely ever
to be accepted throughout the EU. 
A more promising approach would
be to allow skill, age, language
skills and other migrant character-
istics to determine eligibility for a
Blue Card. Ideally, this would be
achieved through a Europe-wide
points system as applies in
Canada.  The Canadian points
system rewards characteristics
such as educational status, young
age, language proficiency and
work experience, which are good
predictors of immigration success.
By similarly enlarging the set of
criteria for the Blue Card well
beyond a salary threshold based
on the first job contract, it ought to
be much easier to agree on a Blue
Card that would grant access to
the entire EU labour market.
Also, more could and should be
done to attract high-skilled
migrants by strengthening the
attractiveness of European
universities, which to some extent
also requires European policy
action as argued in Aghion et al.
(2007). In the US, the quality of its
leading universities is one of the
most important channels by which
top talent is attracted early, and
after their studies foreign-born
students benefit from a special
quota of H1B visas to allow them
to stay on and work. A similar fea-
ture could be introduced in the EU
on the basis of the Blue Card in the
form of a ‘Blue Diploma’, allowing
foreign-born graduates with a
Masters degree (or equivalent)
from a participating university to
find a job in the EU without being
subject to the proposed salary
threshold of the Blue Card
2.
Brain Drain
Perhaps the most serious policy
concern that the Blue Card raises
is its prospective ‘brain drain’
impact on the source country.
Brain drain could have a negative
impact on the growth potential of
the source country’s economy and
the skill premium might increase,
thereby leading to greater inequal-
ity. Furthermore, the fiscal impact
of high-skilled emigration will
generally be negative. 
However, brain drain may not be a
net negative for the source coun-
try. The option to emigrate may
substantially increase the expect-
ed returns on education, thereby
improving private education incen-
tives. Also, if migrants return to
their country of origin – and many
of them do – the skills and savings
that they have acquired abroad
can become a powerful force for
development. For these reasons,
moderate levels of brain drain may
in fact be beneficial for the source
country as is argued, for example,
by Beine et al.(2003). 
North America
& Antipodes
Pop-10
EU greater
neighbourhood
EU-27
1990
2005
01 0 2 03 0 4 0 5 0
Figure 3: Rapid increase in student numbers worldwide 1990-2005
2See also von
Weizsäcker (2006).
Source: World Bank Edstats
EU greater neighbourhood = EU
neighbourhood policy countries+EU
accession countries+Balkan
countries+Turkey+Russia
Pop-10 = ten most populated devel-
oping countries which are China,
India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico,
Vietnam and the Philippines
North America + Antipodes = Canada,
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Further, the explosion of tertiary
education in developing countries
over the last 15 years as present-
ed in Figure 3 has dramatically
increased the supply of skill in
developing countries. In particular,
the number of students in the ten
most populated developing
countries (Pop-10) has trebled,
increasing from 16 million in 1990
to 49 million in 2005. This rapid
increase in the supply of skill is
likely to have reduced the poten-
tially adverse effects of brain drain
for any given level of emigration. In
fact, certain developing economies
even have difficulty in properly
absorbing the rapidly increased
supply of university graduates,
leading to shockingly high unem-
ployment rates among them in
countries such as Morocco. 
Nevertheless, the EU may wish to
consider an opt-out from the Blue
Card for those developing
countries concerned about brain
drain
3. The EU could also make a
point of offering financial support
for tertiary education to develop-
ing countries with particularly
large numbers of high-skilled
migrants to the EU, an area of the
education system that is typically
not covered by donors since the
Millennium Development Goals
rightly focus mainly on primary
education. 
2. IRREGULAR MIGRATION
Unlike legal migrants, irregular
migrants do not have a legal status
t o  l o s e  w h e n  t h e y  m o v e  a r o u n d
within the Schengen area. This de
facto mobility gives rise to sub-
stantial spill-over effects. For
example, an estimated 50 percent
of irregular Ukrainian migrants in
Portugal originally entered the EU
and the average of EU future
accession and neighbourhood
countries around the
Mediterranean and in eastern
Europe. However, the low-income
populations in the vicinity of the
EU are markedly larger than for the
US, suggesting that the longer
term immigration pressures could
also be substantially greater. 
How will Europe respond to these
pressures? The key remedies rou-
tinely advanced are better border
enforcement, more development
assistance for countries of origin,
and new legal migration schemes.
However,  while some of these
measures can make sense, they
are unlikely to be able comprehen-
sively to address the problem of
irregular migration, which is why a
European agreement on a path to
legalisation should be part of any
policy package dealing with irregu-
lar migration.
Better border enforcement: The EU
is already engaged in joint enforce-
ment efforts to reduce irregular
with a Schengen visa issued by the
Austrian or German embassies
4.
The argument for EU coordination
of irregular migration is further
strengthened by the expectation
that immigration pressures are
set to increase in the coming
years.  
Estimates put the stock of irregu-
lar migrants in the EU at between
four and eight million people, with
an inflow of perhaps as much as
half a million per year
5, which
increasingly looks comparable to
the massive influx of migrants
from Mexico to the US. It is esti-
mated that there are currently
some 12 million Mexican immi-
grants living in the US, roughly 60
percent of whom are illegal, while
the illegal inflow from Mexico may
exceed 400,000 migrants
annually.
These immigration pressures are
driven by proximity and income
differences. As shown in Figure 4,
the US-Mexico income gap is
similar to the gap between EU15
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Figure 4: Income gaps of the EU15 and US with their
respective neighbourhoods
3However, it is less
clear whether this opt-
out should also be
extended to govern-
ments that, according
to the consensus view,
fail even remotely to act
in the best interests of
their citizens, as may
currently be the case in
Zimbabwe.
4See Baganha et al.
(2004)
5See Düvell (2006)
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migration. Control of external bor-
ders is to be strengthened (EU
Frontex agency). Efforts to fight
human trafficking are to be
stepped up. And there are plans to
intensify cooperation with major
transit countries and to accelerate
the repatriation of irregular
migrants. Irregular migrants
generally respond to incentives
and it is thus likely that a compre-
hensive set of enforcement meas-
ures will succeed in reducing
inflows. But by how much? Again,
it might be instructive to look to
the US. Recently, the
Congressional Budget Office
(2007) assessed the likely impact
of the (currently stalled)
Comprehensive Immi- gration
Reform Act 2007. It was estimated
that the comprehensive set of
enforcement measures in this bill
would succeed in reducing the
influx of irregular immigrants by
about 25 percent. 
Similarly, the EU might find it diffi-
cult to achieve a reduction in irreg-
ular inflows of more than 25
percent by means of tighter
controls, let alone reduce them to
insignificant levels. The commonly
held view that enforcement alone
might solve the problem of irregu-
lar migration is clearly flawed,
since a large inflow of irregular
migrants can be expected to con-
tinue even with tight controls. It is
important that political decision-
makers put their cards on the table
about this fact. 
Increased development assis-
tance: The argument is often
advanced that increased
development assistance could be
used to improve economic
prospects in key countries of
origin so that the incentive to
emigrate is reduced. However, the
level of income in the country of
origin and the propensity to
emigrate may well be hump-
shaped
6, with rising incomes ini-
tially increasing the likelihood of
emigration. One reason for this is
that poor and credit-constrained
individuals will only find migration
affordable above a certain income
level. Only once income has grown
beyond that thresh-
old will migration go
down on account of
reduced income dif-
ferences between
source and host
country. In view of
substantial uncer-
tainty here, it would
be imprudent to tightly couple
development assistance and
migration policy in the political
discourse. 
Legal migration schemes: It is
sometimes claimed that a suitable
means to combat irregular
immigration could be the expan-
sion of legal immigration schemes,
possibly in the form of temporary
or circular migration. For example,
temporary migration schemes are
to be an integral part of the ‘mobil-
ity partnerships’ that the EU plans
to conclude with source countries,
not least to reduce the inflow of
irregular migrants. However, it is
not clear how effective this would
be. For the sake of argument,
assume that every fourth potential
irregular immigrant manages to
enter the EU. On this assumption,
four potential irregular migrants
would need to be admitted legally
in order to reduce the number of
irregular migrants by one. And this
also – optimistically – assumes
that the four legal migrants would
indeed come from the pool of
potential irregular migrants, which
is not necessarily the case.
Temporary legal migration
schemes may even increase irreg-
ular migration as a result of visa
overstays. 
Path to regularisation: None of the
above approaches is likely to make
the problem of irregular migration
disappear in the foreseeable
future. Therefore, the
EU needs to find a
pragmatic way to
accommodate resid-
ual irregular migra-
tion in ways that are
compatible with
human rights, basic
law and order and the
requirements of integration policy. 
First, more stringent standards
governing the proper treatment of
irregular migrants should be
agreed. With open internal borders,
some member states might other-
wise be tempted to drive irregular
migrants away to neighbouring EU
countries by treating them poorly.
Individual countries that treat
irregular migrants decently might
in any case end up attracting more
than their expected share. Better
and common standards for the
decent treatment of irregular
migrants could help resolve this
problem. 
Second, a basic framework for reg-
ularisation procedures should be
defined, recognising the advan-
tages of timely regularisation, as
opposed to sporadic mass regular-
isations accompanied by unrealis-
tic promises of governments in
denial that new repressive meas-
ures will obviate the need for
repeat mass regularisation. 
‘It might be difficult
to reduce irregular
inflows by more than
25 percent by means
of tighter controls.’
6See eg Adams and
Page (2003).STRAIT IS THE GATE – EUROPE’S IMMIGRATION PRIORITIES
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We propose that a system of con-
tinuous ‘earned regularisation’
should be introduced, offering
accelerated regularisation for
those irregular migrants who rap-
idly acquire language skills and
display other characteristics that
are conducive to rapid integration,
or for humanitarian reasons. By
contrast, irregular migrants who
do not conform to this set of crite-
ria would only be regularised after
a much longer period during which
they would continue to be exposed
to the generally small but non-
negligible risk of forced
repatriation.
The proposed ‘earned regularisa-
tion’ approach could help achieve
the declared objective of the
French EU presidency of abandon-
ing  mass regularisations, and at
the same time offer sufficient flex-
ibility to accommodate the dis-
parate positions of countries like
Spain, Italy, Germany and France
within a single framework. 
3. ASYLUM
With the end of the cold war, the EU
experienced a rapid surge in asy-
lum applications, as can be seen in
Figure 5. In response, member
states progressively tightened
their asylum legislation and also
started progressively to introduce
EU rules governing asylum within
Europe. Hatton (2008) estimates
that these tighter and better coor-
dinated rules have contributed to
about one third of the recent
decline in asylum applications, the
other two thirds being attributable
to a decline in the demand for asy-
lum especially from citizens of
eastern European countries and
the CIS. 
The legal tightening and the
remarkable success in reducing
asylum application numbers (and
to a lesser extent the number of
people granted asylum) raises the
question of whether Europe still
does justice to its ambition to pro-
vide shelter to people who are in
need of protection. While Europe
continues to receive about three
quarters of asylum claims among
industrial countries, the contribu-
tions of individual countries vary
enormously. In particular,
Sweden’s performance is remark-
able, absorbing over ten percent of
total asylum claims received in
industrialised countries in 2007, a
not-so-distant second place
behind the US and well ahead of
much larger EU countries such as
Germany, France, and the UK. 
The fact that 41 percent of the
45,200 Iraqi asylum applicants
worldwide went to Sweden is
something that not only Sweden
but also the rest of the EU should
be proud of and, consequently,
Swedish tax payers should not foot
the bill alone. Perhaps the time has
come to acknowledge that an asy-
lum policy which upholds
European values is a European
public good that should to a larger
extent be provided through joint
financing and joint organisation.
To start with, this could take the
form of a European commitment
proactively to offer 25,000 extra
people per year refuge from perse-
cution and war (or 0.05 percent of
the EU population). Rather than
waiting for these refugees to arrive
at our borders, such a proactive
commitment could include trans-
port logistics where needed. This
special category of humanitarian
migrants could be offered what we
have called a ‘new Nansen’ pass-
port. The previous incarnation of
the Nansen passport was intro-
duced by the Norwegian polar
explorer and Nobel peace prize
winner Fridjof Nansen to equip
refugees from the Russian revolu-
tion with travel papers. 
4. INTEGRATION
Because the mobility of legal
immigrants from third countries
remains relatively low, each mem-
ber state can expect to bear the
overwhelming part of the cost
caused by failed integration
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Figure 5: New asylum applications in the EU
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policies for legal migrants.
Furthermore, differences between
member states in the composition
of immigrant populations, institu-
tional differences not least in edu-
cation and labour markets, and
subtle differences in outlook
reduce the prospect of far-reaching
EU legislation in this area. As a
consequence, integration policies
should mainly be regarded as a
national remit for the time being.
Nevertheless, a continued
European dialogue on the chal-
lenges of integration would appear
to be desirable, providing political
momentum to national integration
policies and enhancing their
quality through joint learning.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions and policy
recommendations identified in
this paper are as follows:
• High-skilled migration: For the
EU successfully to participate
in the global competition for
talent, the Blue Card draft direc-
tive needs to be revised. In par-
ticular, the Blue Card needs to
become more readily transfer-
able so that it genuinely offers
access to the entire EU labour
market. At the same time, con-
cerns about brain drain should
be taken seriously, not least by
offering developing countries
an opt-out clause. 
• Irregular migration: The EU
agenda on irregular migration
must be balanced to succeed.
The currently envisaged efforts
to reduce irregular migration
through tighter controls will
merely slow the inflow of irregu-
lar migrants somewhat but will
not make the problem of irregu-
lar migration disappear. It is
proposed that tighter controls
should be combined with better
and common humanitarian
standards and an agreement on
continuous ‘earned regularisa-
tion’ as an alternative to denial-
induced sporadic mass regular-
isations.
• Asylum: Not least because of
past coordination efforts, asy-
lum applications in Europe have
dropped considerably in recent
years while wars and political
persecution continue to make
people flee their home
countries on a large scale. In
order for Europe to help these
refugees more effectively,  a
‘new Nansen’ scheme offering
25,000 humanitarian immi-
gration slots per year is
proposed, the funding and allo-
cation of which are to be
organised at the European level.